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Fresh elections will be held in Greece following the resignation of Alexis Tsipras as the country’s
Prime Minister. Partha Gangopadhyay writes that while this latest twist in Greek domestic politics
has raised more uncertainty about Greece’s ability to meet the conditions of its bailout agreement,
there is a far wider structural problem with the Eurozone that cannot be addressed via bailouts or
cosmetic changes. He argues that with states tied to a shared monetary policy, and with the EU
possessing only a small budget for promoting convergence among its members, the EU simply
lacks the ﬁscal capacity to deal with large economic shocks.
The ongoing Greek crisis, like any other Greek tragedy, spurs the imagination of every observer that a happy end is
just around the corner – potentially via an improbable and comical turn of events like a deus ex machina. Alas, no
easy solution is on the horizon for resolving the crisis in the foreseeable future. Most recently, it was the turn of
Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras to quit and call early polls. With remarkable alacrity, several rebel Syriza MPs broke
away to join a new party, called Laiki Enotita (Popular Unity), to ﬁght the bailout. Yet regardless of how these
developments in Greek politics play out, the economic problems for the European Union remain deep-rooted and
cosmetic changes, like bailout economics, will inevitably fail.
In the broader framework of economics, it is one of the most enduring realities that economic activities are unevenly
distributed in space – the European Union (EU) is no exception. The natural advantages of some regions in the EU
over others usually lead to clusters of economic activities in more advantageous centres, while others tend to suﬀer.
In other words, should it surprise a keen observer of human development that nature is divisive? It should not since
natural and economic advantages are not equal among regions, with diﬀerent areas of the EU exhibiting climatic
advantages, relative resource abundance, educational cleavages and diﬀerent degrees of accessibility.
All these features, which are grouped under the label of ﬁrst nature, play an important role in explaining the
concentration of economic activities and opulence in speciﬁc locations of the EU. The EU is a dualistic system:
northern members exhibit high labour productivity while other members suﬀer from low productivity. Put simply, the
features of ‘ﬁrst nature’ set some unequal constraints across the EU, which lead to an unequal (spatial) distribution
of economic activities and uneven spatial economic and social development, generating uneven opulence.
It is also the case that human beings have always responded to the binding constraints of ﬁrst nature, mainly by
taking advantage of the unequal spatial distribution of economic activities and uneven opulence. The intended and
unintended consequences of these human responses have acted upon and re-written the existing constraints. The
responses by individuals to the features of ﬁrst nature are termed ‘second nature’.
Within every region in the EU there are therefore forces that promote a concentration of economic activities, known
as the centripetal force, which is in constant opposition with the centrifugal forces that tend to disperse economic
activities away from the region in question. The structure of any regional economy within the EU is inﬂuenced by the
constant tensions between these twin forces. The past and current architects of the EU wagered that centrifugal
forces will eventually exceed their centripetal equivalent, triggering economic and social convergence within the EU.
Of course, such convergence has proven diﬃcult to realise. In the past, during the second half of the 20 th century,
the burden of adjustment in this dualistic Europe took place through the devaluation of national currencies. With the
advent of Economic and Monetary Union, this mechanism became unavailable for member nations, with monetary
policy becoming subject to a one-size-ﬁts all approach. Between 2000 and 2008, trends in GDP growth among
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Southern nations mirrored the EU average and
people started to see the merits in the EU’s wager on
convergence. Unfortunately, with the advent of the
global ﬁnancial crisis, the EU has come to witness the
ugly head of divergence again and the North-South
divide has become only too obvious during the
second Eurozone recession since 2011, visible in
particular in terms of unemployment rates across the
EU.
The EU does not have the ﬁscal capacity to deal with
recessions. This becomes a serious problem if
individual nations, suﬀering from a deep recession,
have already accumulated large debts so that ﬁscal
policy is no longer available as a recession ﬁghting
mechanism. The only available mechanism to
indebted nations to ﬁght recessions is the so-called
process of ‘internal devaluation’, which is a substitute
for (currency) devaluation. Internal devaluation seeks
to cut labour costs and thereby shifts the burden of adjustments within the EU to workers. The Syriza government
has been the expression of resistance to this shift in Greece.
During the formation of the EU, two treaties were established to promote economic, social and territorial
convergence with balanced economic growth within the Union. The preamble to the Treaty on European Union
(TEU) seeks “to achieve the strengthening and the convergence of the EU economies”. The creation of Economic
and Monetary Union with a single and stable currency was widely vetted as a means for upward convergence.
Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) unequivocally highlights that sustainable development of EU
countries will call forth balanced economic growth, price stability and social justice to achieve full employment and
social progress. Article 3 also notes that the main scourges to the EU will include “social exclusion and
discrimination” within the Union.
The means to achieve this sustainable EU are then described in great detail in the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU). In TEFU, the architects of the EU craft the union-wide policy of “overall harmonious
development” with the ultimate goal of “reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various
regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions”. Through the creation of three funds – the European
Regional Development Fund, European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund – the EU seeks to promote
investments in infrastructure, human capital, innovation, resource eﬃciency and business development. They cover
the entire Union and the focus of the funds lies in the ‘less developed regions’, whose GDP is below 75 per cent of
the EU average.
Despite the good intentions of this framework, the EU has a miniscule budget of 1 per cent of GDP. Within that
budget, EU convergence and cohesion policy has an allocation of only 0.4 per cent of GDP, which is a budget for all
28 members of the EU for promoting long-term convergence between countries and regions within countries. This is
barely adequate. In other words, the EU does not have the ﬁscal capacity, as an insurance mechanism for member
states, to exercise temporary ﬁscal stimuli to combat an economic downturn in multiple member countries. Unless
the current architects develop an adequate ﬁscal capacity, the EU will fail to act responsibly whenever large
economic shocks hit them.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
2/3
of the London School of Economics.
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/1MI4vrD
 _________________________________
About the author
Partha Gangopadhyay – University of Western Sydney
Partha Gangopadhyay is Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Western Sydney.
3/3
